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MIRANDA THIRTY-FIVE YEARS LATER: A Close
Look at the Majority and Dissenting Opinions
in Dickerson*
Yale Kamisart
Over the years, Miranda v. Arizona' has been criticized both for going
too far' and for not going far enough. Nevertheless, on the basis of talks
with many criminal procedure professors in the sixteen months between the
time a panel of the Fourth Circuit upheld a statute (18 U.S.C. § 3501)
purporting to "overrule" Miranda and a 7-2 majority of the Supreme Court
overturned that ruling in the case of Dickerson v. United States,4 I am
convinced that most criminal procedure professors wanted the Supreme
Court to do what it did-"reaffirm" Miranda. This is not surprising. As
Professor Grano once observed, "a person need only attend academic
conferences on criminal procedure to discover how discrete and insular
'conservatives' are in academia."'
However, I think all the many professors teaching criminal procedure
realized that we would be in much greater demand if the Fourth Circuit's
ruling were to be upheld by the Supreme Court-if the centerpiece of the
Warren Court's revolution in American criminal procedure were to be
eradicated by the Rehnquist Court. For in such an event the resulting
confusion would have been enormous-and we would have been popping up
* This Article was the basis for the 2001 Willard Pedrick Lecture delivered at the Arizona
State University College of Law on April 5, 2001.
t Clarence Darrow Distinguished University Professor, University of Michigan Law
School; Visiting Professor, University of San Diego Law School. I am indebted to Marc
Spindelman for his helpful suggestions.
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. See, e.g., JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW 199-222 (1993);
Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417, 1419 (1985); Fred E. Inbau,
'Playing God': 5 to 4 (The Supreme Court and the Police), 57 J. CRiM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POL.
Sci. 377, 377 (1966).
3. See, e.g., Francis A. Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and
the Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L. F. 518, 537-38; Charles J. Ogletree, Are Confessions Really
Good for the Soul?: A Proposal to Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1826, 1842-45 (1987);
Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, A Modest Proposal for the Abolition of Custodial
Confessions, 68 N.C. L. REV. 69, 110 (1989).
4. 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000), rev'g 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999).
5. Joseph D. Grano, Introduction-The Changed and Changing World of Constitutional
Criminal Procedure, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 395, 398 n.12 (1989).
HeinOnline  -- 33 Ariz. St. L.J. 387 2001
ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL
on radio and television in much the way all those "election law specialists"
did during the protracted 2000 presidential election.
I. WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN
Suppose, in a Miranda-less stationhouse, 6 a suspect were to ask the police
whether she had to answer their questions or whether the police had a right
to an answer." How should the police respond?
Or suppose a custodial suspect were to ask an officer whether she could
first meet with her own lawyer (or a lawyer) before answering any questions
or whether the police could (or would) prevent her from seeing or
communicating with a lawyer until she answered their questions. Once
again, how should a police officer respond?
As Chief Justice Warren pointed out a week after Miranda, the fourteenth
amendment due process-"voluntariness"-"totality of the circumstances"
standard for the admissibility of confessions had become "increasingly
6. Professor Paul Cassell, who was appointed by the Court in Dickerson to defend the
constitutionality of § 3501 (because the Department of Justice would not do so), sought to assure the
Court that, even if § 3501 were upheld and Miranda displaced by a statutory voluntariness- totality
of circumstances test, the police would continue to give the Miranda warnings. Perhaps some
police departments would do so in the months immediately after the overturning of Miranda-but I
doubt that they would in what they considered "exceptional" or "compelling" cases. And it would
hardly be surprising if some of the departments who assured us that they were going to continue to
warn suspects of their rights after the fall of Miranda (at least for a while) chose an abbreviated or
diluted version of the warnings, such as "anything you say can be used for or against you."
Moreover, in a world without Miranda, if the prosecution chose to utilize a statement obtained in
violation of internal police regulations requiring Miranda warnings to continue to be given, the
defense would not be able to suppress the statement simply because it was obtained in violation of
police regulations. See United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 757 (1979).
In any event, I share the view of Professor George Thomas that even if, in the wake of
the demise of Miranda, the police continued to give the Miranda warnings, "over time, the number
of cases in which warnings [would be] given would fall, and if courts routinely admit[tedI these
confessions under Section 3501, the police [would] learn that Miranda is truly no longer crucial."
George C. Thomas, III, The End of the Road for Miranda v. Arizona?: On the History and Future
of Rules for Police Interrogation, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 31 (2000).
Finally, after the demise of Miranda, some police departments might continue to require their
officers to give the now-familiar warnings, but eliminate other "harmful features" of Miranda. Cf.
Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Socida Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 387, 496
(1996) (in return for the additional safeguard of taping police interrogations, we might "dispense
with the requirement that police obtain an affirmative waiver of rights from suspects, [a]
particularly harmful feature of Miranda" and "the requirement that police immediately terminate an
interview whenever the suspect requests an end to the interview or an opportunity to meet with
counsel").
7. Such questions would hardly be surprising. After all, over the years tens of millions of
Americans have watched many detective shows on TV.
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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meticulous through the years."8 On the eve of Miranda, the test demanded
a good deal more of the police than it had in 1936, the year the Court
decided its first fourteenth amendment due process confession case.9
A persuasive argument may be made that, as it had evolved by the time of
Miranda, the due process-voluntariness test would have (1) barred the use of
any statement made by a suspect who had been told that she must answer
police questions or told that the police had a right to an answer; (2)
prohibited, at the least, the use of statements that were the product of any
stationhouse questioning in the face of repeated expressions by the suspect of
unwillingness to talk to the police until first consulting with a lawyer.
As to (1), perhaps the strongest contemporary critic of the Warren
Court's approach to police interrogation and confessions, Justice White,
dissenting in Escobedo v. Illinoisa° (as he was to dissent in Miranda),
recognized that under the due process-voluntariness test if a suspect "is told
he must answer and does not know better, it would be very doubtful that the
resulting admissions could be used against him."" More recently, Professor
Joseph Grano, a long-time critic of Miranda (and the Warren Court's
criminal procedure cases generally), observed that because the police "may
not deceive defendants about the nature or scope of their legal rights," "it
would violate due process to tell suspects that they are obligated to answer
questions. "12
As to (2), 1 am aware that two 1958 cases, Crooker v. California,3 and
the companion case of Cicenia v. LaGay, 4 seem to refute my claim that by
the mid-1960's the due process-voluntariness test had progressed to the point
that police questioning of a suspect after denying his requests to contact a
lawyer would have been considered unacceptably "coercive." Indeed,
Crooker and Cicenia seem to say just the opposite. But I doubt that these
8. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 730 (1966); see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 508
(Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[S]ynopses of the cases [applying the pre-Miranda voluntariness test]
would serve little use because the overall gauge has been steadily changing, usually in the direction
of restricting admissibility.").
9. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). Professor Thomas recently described this
case as, "[o]ne suspect was hanged, let down, hanged again, let down, tied to a tree and whipped."
Thomas, supra note 6, at 5.
10. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
11. Id. at 499 (White, J., joined by Clark, J., and Stewart, I., dissenting).
12. GRANO, supra note 2, at 114; see also Donald Dripps, Is the Miranda Caselaw Really
Inconsistent?: A Proposed Fifth Ameudment Synthesis, 17 CONST. COMMENT 19. 24 (2000) ("A
citizen... alys had the right to refuse to answer questions put by the police. ... The Court's
cases ... forbid state-imposed penalties for exercising the right to remain silent." (emphasis
added)).
13. 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
14. 357 U.S. 504 (1958).
389
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cases were still viable after 1963, when the Court handed down Haynes v.
Washington,'5 the last of the pre-Miranda cases to apply the voluntariness
test.
Mr. Haynes had asked the police several times to allow him to call his
wife, only to be told each time that he would not be permitted to do so unless
and until he admitted his involvement in the case.' 6 In striking down the
resulting confession in light of "the unfair and inherently coercive context in
which made,"' 7 a 5-4 majority highlighted the police's refusal to allow the
defendant communication with and access to his family unless and until he
"cooperated" with them. 8
If anything, repeated denials of a suspect's request to call a lawyer strike
me as more likely to underscore the intimidating nature of incommunicado
detention than repeated denial of a suspect's request to contact his spouse.
After all, as the Court has noted, "the lawyer occupies a critical position in
our legal system because of his unique ability to protect [a] client undergoing
custodial interrogation."' 9 Thus, I do not see how one can reconcile the
Court's position in Haynes with its approach five years earlier in Crooker
and Cicenia. Neither could Justice Clark-who wrote the opinion of the
Court in Crooker, but filed an angry dissent in Haynes.'
Of course, whether, in a Miranda-less world, (1) the police could tell a
suspect that she had to answer their questions or (2) could reject a suspect's
requests to communicate with a lawyer and still use the resulting confession,
are questions whose answers are not perfectly clear. But that very fact may
be one of the reasons the Dickerson Court reaffirmed Miranda.
To be sure, this is speculation. But the majority opinion Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote in Dickerson-"reaffirming" the constitutionality of
Miranda--2 is so spare and so cryptic that it is difficult, if not impossible, to
discuss it without engaging in a good deal of speculation.
15. 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
16. Id. at504.
17. Id. at 514.
18. Id.
19. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 (1979).
20. See Haynes, 373 U.S. at 525 (Clark, J., dissenting).
21. According to Miranda, a person taken into police custody must be advised of her rights
(the now-familiar warnings) and waive those rights before statements obtained from her may be
admitted into evidence. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-70. A provision of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968, a provision commonly known as § 3501 because of its designation
under Title 18 of the United States Code, made the pre-Miranda "due process"-'totality of
circursances"-"voluntariness" doctrine the sole test for the admissibility of confessions in federal
prosecutions, thereby purporting to overrule the Warren Court's most famous confession case. 18
U.S.C. § 3501 (1994). Dickerson held that Miranda, "being a constitutional decision of (the]
Court," Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2329, could "not be in effect overruled by an Act of Congress,"
[Ariz. St. L.J.390
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II. SPECULATION ON WHY SEVEN JUSTICES VOTED TO "REAFFIRM"
MIRANDA AND How AND WHY CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST WROTE AN
UNSATISFACTORY OPINION
Because the Supreme Court Justices of the 1970s and 1980s "themselves
undermined the [Miranda] rule, in part by their eagerness to slice pieces off
whenever possible, but worse by saying peculiar things like, 'these
procedural safeguards were not themselves rights protected by the
Constitution,"" the Dickerson case has been called "a devil of the Court's
own doing."3 One might go a step further and call it a devil of then-Justice
Rehnquist's own doing.
The key case is Michigan v. Tucker,'4 now more than a quarter-century
old. Tucker did not deal with the admissibility of the defendant's own
statements-they had been excluded-but only with the testimony of a
witness whose identity had been discovered by questioning the defendant in
violation of Miranda. In admitting the testimony of the witness, the Court,
per Justice Rehnquist, seemed to equate the "compulsion" barred by the
privilege against self-incrimination with "coercion" or "involuntariness"
under the pre-Miranda "totality of circumstances"-case-by-case-
"voluntariness" test.'
This is quite misleading. Much harsher police methods were needed to
render a confession "coerced" or "involuntary" under the pre-Miranda test
than the Miranda Court deemed necessary to make a confession "compelled"
within the meaning of the self-incrimination clause.' That is one of the
id. The Court then added: "and we decline to overrule [it] ourselves." Id. For a discussion of the
evolution of § 3501, the testimony at the Senate subcommittee hearings and the tone and quality of
the Senate debate over the proposal that became § 3501, see Yale Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress
1Override" Miranda?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 883, 884-906 (2000).
Although it has often been said that Miranda supplanted or scrapped the pre-Miranda
voluntariness test, this is not entirely accurate. The Miranda Court did find the voluntariness test
unsatisfactory, but it did not replace it in all settings. Miranda added another test; the voluntariness
test is still there. Just as the police may satisfy the voluntariness test but violate Miranda's
requirements, so may they comply with Miranda but fail the voluntariness test. For example, if a
suspect effectively waives his Miranda ights and agrees to talk to the police, but insists he is
completely innocent, the police may not subject him to coercive or offensive interrogation
techniques that transgress due process-voluntariness standards.
22. Michael C. Dorf & Barry Friedman, Shared Constitutional Interpretation, 2000 SUP. CT.
REV. 1, 10 (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444(1974) (Rehnquist, J.)).
23. Id.
24. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
25. See id. at444-46.
26. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda, Dickerson and the Puzzling Persistence of Fifth
Amendment Exceptionalism, 99 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001) (manuscript at 13, on file with
author) [hereinafter Schulhofer, Puzzling Persistence]; Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering
Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 440-46 (1987) [hereinafter Schulhofer, Reconsidering]; see also
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basic premises of Miranda. That is why, although his questioning had been
quite mild compared to the oppressive and offensive police interrogation
methods that had barred the use of statements in the older confession cases,
Ernesto Miranda's statements were held inadmissible.
The Tucker Court dealt Miranda another blow. In the course of holding
the witness's testimony admissible, Justice Rehnquist told us that the
Miranda Court itself had "recognized" that the four warnings "were not
themselves rights protected by the Constitution," but only prophylactic
standards designed to "safeguard" or to "provide practical reinforcement"
for the privilege against self-incrimination."
Commentators protested that Tucker and the cases that built on it "cut the
doctrinal heart out of Miranda"28 and warned that "Tucker seems certainly to
have laid the groundwork to overrule Miranda" (even without regard to §
3501).2' But the Court never administered the coup de grace.
However, the Court continued to quote Tucker's mischievous language
approvingly and continued to look at, and speak about, Miranda the way it
had in Tucker. In both New York v. Quarles" and Oregon v. Elstad' the
Court underscored the distinction between actual coercion by physical
violence or threats of violence and inherently or irrebuttably presumed
coercion (the basis for the Miranda rules) and between statements that are
actually "coerced" or "compelled" and those obtained merely in violation of
Miranda's "procedural safeguards" or "prophylactic rules. "32
Yale Kamisar, The "Police Practice" Phases of the Criminal Process and the Three Phases of the
Burger Court, in THE BURGER YEARS: RIGHTS AND WRONGS IN THE SUPREME COURT 1969-1986,
at 143, 152-53 (Herman Schwartz ed., 1987).
27. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444. This, too, is quite misleading. The Miranda Court did say that
the Constitution does not "require ... adherence to any particular solution for the inherent
compulsions of the interrogation process as it is presently conducted." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467
(emphasis added). But it quickly added: "However, unless we are shown other procedures which
are at least as effective in apprising accused person of their [rights) and in assuring a continuous
opportunity to exercise [them], the following safeguards [the Miranda warnings] must be
observed." Id. (emphasis added). Moreover, later in the opinion, the Miranda Court reiterated:
"The warnings required and the waiver necessary in accordance with our opinion today are, in the
absence of a fuily effective equimlent, prerequisites to the admissibility of any statements made by a
defendant." Id. at 476 (emphasis added).
28. Lawrence Herman, The Supreme Court, the Attorney General, and the Good Old Days of
Police Interrogation, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 740 (1987).
29. Geoffrey R. Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 99,
123.
30. 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (establishing a "public safety" exception to Miranda).
31. 470 U.S. 298 (1985); see also infra text accompanying notes 66-67.
32. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 307; Quarles, 467 U.S. at 654-55. The Burger Court had drawn the
same distinction in another line of cases that began even before Tucker was decided. See Oregon v.
Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975) (stating that one who takes the stand in his own defense can be
impeached by statements taken from him in violation of Miranda, even when statements obtained
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In Elstad, speaking for a 6-3 majority, Justice O'Connor emphasized that
"the Miranda exclusionary rule ... sweeps more broadly than the Fifth
Amendment itself" 33 and "may be triggered even in the absence of a Fifth
Amendment violation."' The Elstad Court seemed to say-it certainly may
plausibly be read as saying-that because a violation of Miranda is not a real
constitutional violation, it is not entitled to, or worthy of, the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine. Thus, unlike evidence obtained as the result of a
Fourth Amendment violation (which is a real violation), evidence uncovered
following a Miranda violation need not, and should not, be suppressed as the
tainted fruit.35
In the meantime, the Court continued to overturn state convictions
because of Miranda violations.' Yet, as Justice Stevens emphasized in his
Elstad dissent, "[tihis Court's power to require state courts to exclude
after suspect asserted right to counsel); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (stating that one
who takes the stand in his own defense can be impeached by statements taken from him in violation
of Miranda). Some years later, the Court held that neither testimony given in response to a grant of
immunity, New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979), nor statements that were "coerced" in the
pre-Miranda sense, Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), could be used for impeachment
purposes. Thus, here, too, a distinct line was drawn between statements that are only presumptively
compelled (Miranda violations) and those that are actually compelled.
33. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 305, 308-09. For a discussion of "real" and "just pretend" constitutional rights,
see Albert W. Alschuler, Failed Pragmatism: Reflections on the Burger Court, 100 HARV. L. REV.
1436 (1987).
36. See, e.g., Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S.
675 (1988); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). In Dickerson, Chief Justice Rehnquist
noted that since Miranda was decided, "we have consistently applied Miranda's rule to prosecutions
arising in state courts." 120 S. Ct. at 2329, 2333.
Although in the main, the post-Warren Court applied Miranda begrudgingly. Edwards v.
Arizona, 451 U.S. 478 (1981), is a notable exception. Edwards invigorated Miranda in an
important respect. It held that when a suspect effectively asserts his right to a lawyer (as opposed
to his right to remain silent), he may not be subjected to further police interrogation "until counsel
has been made available to him, unless [he] himself initiates further communication... with the
police." Id. at 484-85 (emphasis added). In short, once a suspect invokes his right to counsel, the
police cannot try to change his mind; they must wait to see whether the suspect changes his mind on
his own initiative. Subsequent cases informed us that the Edwards rule applies even when the
police want to question a suspect about a crime weated to the subject of their initial interrogation,
Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, and even if the suspect has been allowed to consult with an attorney in the
interim, Minnick, 498 U.S. 146.
Another post-Warren Court case that gladdened the hearts of Miranda supporters was Withrow
v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993). The Withrow Court surprised many Court-watchers when it held
that, unlike the situation when a state prisoner alleges that his conviction rests on evidence obtained
in violation of the Fourth Amendment, see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976)), state prisoners
may bring alleged Miranda violations before the federal courts in habeas corpus proceedings. See
infra text accompanying notes 73-77 for extracts from the opinions in Withrow.
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probative self-incriminatory statements rests entirely on the premise that the
use of such evidence violates the Federal Constitution. "1
As we awaited the decision in Dickerson, almost all of us assumed that,
as Donald Dripps put it, "the Court would have to either repudiate Miranda,
repudiate the prophylactic-rule cases, or offer some ingenious reconciliation
of the two lines of precedent. "38 But as Professor Dripps points out
immediately thereafter, the Dickerson Court did none of these things.
Instead, charges Susan Klein (and I am inclined to agree), Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote an opinion "that cannot be characterized as plausible. In an
apparent compromise between the right and left wings of the Court,
Rehnquist holds that the law is to stay exactly as it was pre-Dickerson, by
judicial fiat. "39
Why did a majority of the Court brush aside language in cases like Tucker
that seemed to view Miranda as a subconstitutional rule?4? Why, instead, did
the Court emphasize that "both Miranda and two of its companion cases
applied the rule to proceedings in state courts,""' "[s]ince that time, we have
consistently applied Miranda's rule to prosecutions arising in state courts,"
and "(ilt is beyond dispute that we do not hold a supervisory power over the
courts of the several States"?' (The Court could have said the same things
the day it decided Tucker. In fact, dissenting Justice Douglas did.43)
I shall try to explain why, or at least suggest various reasons why, a large
majority voted to "reaffirm" Miranda and why Chief Justice Rehnquist, long
regarded as a relentless critic of Miranda, not only was part of that majority
37. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 371. Eleven years earlier, dissenting in Tucker, Justice Douglas had
made a similar point. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 462-63 (1974).
38. Donald A. Dripps, Constitutional Theory for Criminal Procedure: Miranda, Dickerson
and the Continuing Quest for Broad-But-Shallow 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2001)
(manuscript at 33, on file with author). For a similar, but somewhat different analysis of the
Dickerson Court's options, none of which it chose, see Susan R. Klein, Identifying and
(Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors and Incidental Rights in Constitutional Criminal
Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REv. (forthcoming 2001) (manuscript at 38-45, on file with author).
39. Klein, supra note 38, at 38.
40. See Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2333 ("We disagree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion
[that the Miranda protections are not constitutionally required], although we concede that there is
language in some of our opinions that supports the view taken by that court.").
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 462-63 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). The
Dickerson Court also noted that Chief Justice Warren's opinion in Miranda "is replete with
statements indicating that the majority thought it was announcing a constitutional rule." Dickerson,
120 S. Ct. at 2334. Of course, this, too, could have been pointed out the day that Tucker was
decided.
[Ariz. St. U.
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but wrote the opinion of the Court." (Explaining why the Supreme Court
decides a case the way it does is no great feat, so long as one does so after
the event).45 Consider the following, for example:
c Section 3501 was not really a response to the Court's invitation to
Congress to produce alternative safeguards to the Miranda warnings,
but rather an "angry, disrespectful and disingenuous attempt" "to
overrule a decision [Congress] loathed."' Section 3501 "was a slap
at the Court and if any Court was likely to slap back, it was this
one. "
47
u The Court had been aware for some time that Miranda was much
more of a "compromise"-much more of a serious effort to protect
both the defendant's and society's interests-than was generally
realized at the time the decision was handed down. As Justice
O'Connor, speaking for a 6-3 majority in Moran v. Burbine,"
reminded us fifteen years ago, Miranda rejected "the more extreme
position" advocated by the ACLU that nothing less than "the actual
presence of a lawyer" (as opposed merely to the issuance of warnings
about one's rights) was needed to dispel the compelling pressure
inherent in custodial interrogation. 9 Instead, the Miranda Court
concluded, to quote Justice O'Connor again, that "the suspect's Fifth
44. I have speculated at some length elsewhere about why, in Dickerson, the Chief Justice
himself did a turnabout. Yale Kamisar, Foreword: From Miranda to § 3501 to Dickerson to ....
99 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001) (manuscript at 20-24, on file with author).
45. I gave a talk on the Dickerson case at Cornell Law School three months before the case
was decided. When asked by a student to predict the outcome of the case, I said what I thought at
the time-it was "too close to call." To my dismay, I received a copy of the Cornell Law Forum
quoting me to this effect a week after a 7-2 lopsided majority had "reaffirmed" Miranda. See
CORNELL L.F., July 2000 at 15.
46. Klein, supra note 38, at 27-28; see also Robert A. Burt, Miranda and Title II: A
Morganatic Marriage, 1969 SUP. CT. REV. 81, 127 ("[Section 3501] was, to an important degree,
a gesture of defiance at a Court which protected criminals and Communists....").
47. Dorf & Friedman, supra note 22, at 12. Professors Dorf and Friedman add: "For the
Court that in recent years has given us Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida [517 U.S. 44 (1996)],
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. [514 U.S. 211 (1995)], City of Boerne v. Flores [521 U.S. 507
(1997)] and other decisions favoring its own power at the expense of Congress, Section 3501 was a
gnat that ran into the windshield of whatever it was that Miranda held." Id.; see also Craig
Bradley, Behind the Dickerson Decision, TRIAL, Oct. 2000, at 80 ("In Dickerson, the majority sent
a strong message to Congress: Stay off our turf.").
48. 475 U.S 412 (1986).
49. Id. at 426 (emphasis added).
HeinOnline  -- 33 Ariz. St. L.J. 395 2001
ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL
Amendment rights could be adequately protected by less intrusive
means. 50
u Over three decades, Miranda had acquired a number of exceptions
that significantly weakened it (or, as critics of Miranda might put it,
made the doctrine more workable).5 It seems clear that Chief Justice
Rehnquist was talking about how the cases carving out exceptions to
Miranda had reduced its adverse impact on police activity when he
noted that "our subsequent cases have reduced the impact of the
Miranda rule on legitimate law enforcement." 2
o At least some members of the Dickerson majority must have known
that the police obtain waivers of rights in the "overwhelming
majority" of cases53 and that once they do "Miranda offers very little,
if any, meaningful protection."' To be sure, suspects who agree to
talk to the police may still cut off questioning or invoke their right to
have counsel-but they "almost never" do.55
u The Dickerson majority must have been aware that when the police
have complied with Miranda and a suspect has waived his rights, it is
extremely difficult to establish that any resulting confession. was
"involuntary" in the pre-Miranda due process-voluntariness sense.5
After all, in Dickerson Chief Justice Rehnquist pretty much
recognized that an effective waiver of a suspect's rights often has the
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (declining to apply the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine to a second statement elicited from a suspect whose first statement had
been obtained in violation of Miranda); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (recognizing a
"public safety" exception to the Miranda warnings); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)
(permitting the prosecution to impeach a defendant who takes the stand in his own defense by using
statements obtained from him in violation of Miranda).
52. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2336.
53. Richard A. Leo, Questioning the Relevance of Miranda in the Twenty-First Century, 99
MICH. L. REv. (forthcoming 2001) (manuscript at 21, on file with author).
54. Id. at 24.
55. William 1. Stuntz, Miranda's Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001)
(manuscript at 3, on file with author); see also Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police
Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839,
859-60 (1996); Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
621, 653 (1996).
56. Welsh S. White, Miranda's Failure to Restrain Pernicious Interrogation Practices, 99
MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001) (manuscript at 10, on file with author); see also Leo, supra
note 53, at 35-37); Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673, 744-46
(1992).
396 [Ariz. St. L.J.
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effect of minimizing the scrutiny courts give police interrogation
practices following the waiver. 7
c The "overruling" of Miranda by legislation would have wiped out
more than three decades of Miranda jurisprudence-nearly 60 cases.5"
Why pay this price when, whatever their initial experience with
Miranda, the police now seem to be living comfortably with it?59
o As an associate justice, Rehnquist might not have voted to "reaffirm"
Miranda. In Dickerson, however, he "show[ed] the kind of
leadership that he has long admired in previous chief justices," such
as Charles Evans Hughes, who was "willing to modify his own
opinions to hold or increase his majority."'
I share the view of Donald Dripps that "[t]he fact that Chief Justice
Rehnquist, for decades an implacable critic of Miranda, wrote the majority
opinion [in Dickerson is] a sure sign of a compromise opinion, intentionally
written to say less rather than more, for the sake of achieving a strong
majority on the narrow question of Miranda's continued vitality."" I agree,
too, although I am quite unhappy about it, that "[t]he apparent gist of that
compromise is that the status quo will be maintained,"' i.e., in the years
ahead we are likely to learn that the Dickerson Court reaffirmed Miranda
with all its qualifications and exceptions "frozen in time." The trouble is
that, not infrequently, the clarity and general quality of a "compromise
opinion" leaves a good deal to be desired. Dickerson marks one of those
times.
In Dickerson, the court of appeals, which had upheld § 3501, had relied
in part on various Supreme Court cases carving out exceptions to Miranda.'
57. "The requirement that Miranda warnings be given does not, of course, dispense with the
voluntariness inquiry. But. . . '[clases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a
self-incriminating statement was "compelled" despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities
adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.'" Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2336 (quoting Berkemer v.
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 (1984)).
58. As dissenting Justice Scalia noted in Dickerson, in the 34 years since Miranda had been
announced, "this Court has been called upon to decide nearly 60 cases involving a host of Miranda
issues." 120 S. Ct. at 2347 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting).
59. See, e.g., Richard A. Leo & Welsh S. White, Adapting to Miranda: Modem
Interrogators' Strategies for Dealing with the Obstacles Posed by Miranda, 44 MINN. L. REV. 397
(1999).
60. Bradley, supra note 47, at 80.
61. Dripps, supra note 38, at 3.
62. Id. at36.
63. See Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2335.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist's response was that these cases simply "illustrate the
principle-not that Miranda is not a constitutional rule-but that no
constitutional rule is immutable."" Is this supposed to be illuminating?'
As for Elstad,' refusing to apply the "fruit of the poisonous tree"
doctrine, a staple of Fourth Amendment law, to Miranda violations, all the
Chief Justice had to say was that this case "does not prove that Miranda is a
nonconstitutional decision, but simply recognizes the fact that unreasonable
searches under the Fourth Amendment are different from unwarned
interrogation under the Fifth Amendment."67 (Showing remarkable restraint,
dissenting Justice Scalia retorted that the Court's statement "is true but
supremely unhelpful."")
In Dickerson, the court of appeals also relied on the fact that the Supreme
Court had "repeatedly referred to the Miranda warnings as 'prophylactic'
and 'not themselves rights protected by the Constitution.'"'9 Both quotations
came from opinions of the Court written by then-Justice Rehnquist."° How
did the Chief Justice respond? He voiced disagreement with the court of
appeals' conclusion that Miranda protections are not constitutionally
required, but "concede[d] that there is language in some of our opinions that
supports the view taken by that court."7 ' That's all. This must be the most
peremptory dismissal ever of majority opinions by the Justice who wrote
them.
In fairness to Chief Justice Rehnquist, it was quite an accomplishment to
get six members of the Court with differing views on the subject to join his
opinion. And it is hard to see how the Chief Justice could have held all six
Justices if he had written at any length about the constitutional status of
prophylactic rules in general or the Miranda rules in particular.
64. Id.
65. The Chief Justice added that "the sort of modifications represented by [decisions making
exceptions to Miranda] are as much a normal part of constitutional law as the original decision."
Id. Still not very illuminating. One who had not read these cases would not know from the
discussion in Dickerson that many appeared to be based on the premise that Miranda was not a
constitutional decision.
66. See supra text accompanying notes 33-35; see also supra note 50.
67. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2335.
68. Id. at 2343. Bu see David A. Strauss, Miranda, The Constitution, and Congress, 99
MICH. L. REv. (forthcoming 2001) (manuscript at 19-20, on file with author), quoted infra note
203.
69. See Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2333.
70. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653 (1984); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,
444 (1974).
71. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2333.
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority included Justices O'Connor, Stevens
and Souter. Could anybody have written a short essay on "prophylactic
rules" and "core constitutional rights" that pleased all three of these Justices?
In Withrow v. Williams,7 the Court, per Justice Souter, rejected the
government's argument that since "Miranda's safeguards are not
constitutional in character, but merely 'prophylactic,'" federal habeas review
should not extend to claims based on violations of those procedures.' The
Withrow Court accepted the government's characterization of the Miranda
safeguards, for purposes of the case, but not its conclusion. Along the way,
Justice Souter had some very nice things to say about Miranda and its
prophylactic rules:
"Prophylactic" though it may be, in protecting a defendant's Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, Miranda
safeguards "a fundamental trial right." The privilege ... reflects
"many of our fundamental values and most noble
aspirations.. .."
Nor does the Fifth Amendment "trial right" protected by
Miranda serve some value necessarily divorced from the correct
ascertainment of guilt.... By bracing against "the possibility of
unreliable statements in every instance of in-custody
interrogation," Miranda serves to guard against "the use of
unreliable statements at trial. '74
On the other hand, the Withrow case saw Justice O'Connor (joined,
incidentally, by Chief Justice Rehnquist) launch a strong attack on Miranda:
Excluding Miranda claims from habeas ... denies collateral
relief only in those cases in which the prisoner's statement was
neither compelled nor involuntary but merely obtained without the
benefit of Miranda's prophylactic warnings. The availability of a
suppression remedy in such cases cannot be labeled a "fundamental
trial right," for there is no constitutional right to the suppression of
voluntary statements....
* ' *Whatever the Fifth Amendment's relationship to
reliability, Miranda's prophylactic rule is not merely "divorced"
from the quest for truth but at war with it as well. The absence of
Miranda warnings does not by some mysterious alchemy convert a
72. 507 U.S. 680 (1993); see also supra note 36.
73. Withrow, 507 U.S. at 690.
74. Id. at 691-92.
75. d. at 706.
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voluntary and trustworthy statement into an involuntary and
unreliable one... 76
A Miranda claim ... requires no evidence of police
overreaching whatsoever; it is enough that law enforcement
officers commit a technical error. Even the forgetful failure to
issue warnings to the most wary, knowledgeable, and seasoned of
criminals will do.77
In Elstad, s this time writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor (again
joined by then-Justice Rehnquist) also had some unflattering things to say
about Miranda:
The Miranda exclusionary rule ... serves the Fifth Amendment
and sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself. It may
be triggered even in the absence of a Fifth Amendment violation. 79
... If errors are made by law enforcement officers in
administering the prophylactic Miranda procedures, they should
not breed the same irremediable consequences as police
infringement of the Fifth Amendment itself.... .1
There is a vast difference between the direct consequences
flowing from coercion of a confession by physical violence or
other deliberate means .. . and the uncertain consequences of
disclosure of a "guilty secret" freely given in response to an
unwarned but noncoercive question, as in this case."
This time it was Justice Stevens' turn to dissent. Finding the majority's
"somewhat opaque characterization of the police conduct in this case" the
"most disturbing aspect of the Court's opinion,"' Justice Stevens protested:
The Court appears ambivalent on the question whether there was
any constitutional violation. This ambivalence is either
disingenuous or completely lawless. This Court's power to require
state courts to exclude probative self-incriminatory statements rests
entirely on the premise that the use of such evidence violates the
76. Id. at 707.
77. Id. at 708-09.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 33-35.
79. 470 U.S. at 306.
80. Id. at 309.
81. Id. at 312.
82. Id. at 370.
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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Federal Constitution. The same constitutional analysis applies
whether the custodial interrogation is actually coercive or
irrebuttably presumed to be coercive. If the Court does not accept
that premise, it must regard the holding in the Miranda case itself,
as well as all of the federal jurisprudence that has evolved from
that decision, as nothing more than an illegitimate exercise of raw
judicial power.'
With Justices O'Connor, Souter and Stevens all in his camp (along with
three others whose enthusiasm for Miranda probably varies quite a bit), it is
unsurprising that the Chief Justice's majority opinion was "intentionally
written to say less rather than more, for the sake of achieving a strong
majority on the narrow question of Miranda's continued vitality."'
However, this made the majority opinion an attractive target for dissenting
Justice Scalia. But the fact that the Chief Justice all but ignored Justice
Scalia's fusillade does not mean that no plausible responses exist.
III. A DISSENT FROM THE DICKERSON DISSENTs 5
Dissenting in Dickerson, Justice Scalia (joined by Thomas, J.) severely
criticized both Miranda itself and Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion of the
Court in Dickerson. According to Justice Scalia, although the Constitution
only prevents one from being "compelled" to confess (compelled within the
meaning of the traditional "voluntariness" test), Miranda prevents a suspect
from "foolishly" confessing of his own accord." Indeed, the "most
remarkable" thing about Miranda is its "palpable hostility" toward the act of
confessing." Moreover, the promulgation of "prophylactic rules," such as
the Miranda warnings, is a "lawless practice," and an "illegitimate exercise"
of the Court's authority to overturn state criminal convictions.8
As for the opinion of the Court in Dickerson, the majority cannot even
bring itself to say flatly that the use of an un-Mirandized confession, but one
that would have passed muster under the traditional voluntariness test,
83. Id. at 370-71.
84. See supra text accompanying note 61; cf. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Book Review, 62
HARV. L. REV. 891, 901 (1949) ("[A] judge who is trying to establish a doctrine which the
Supreme Court will promulgate as law cannot write like a solitary philosopher. He has to convince
at least four [others] in a specific group and convince them very soon.").
85. Cf. Yale Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the "New"
Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 Mich. L. Rev. 59 (1966).
86. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
87. See inf-a note 114 and accompanying text.
88. See infra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
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violates the Constitution.8' What is more, adds Justice Scalia, in light of the
Tucker-line of cases and other confession opinions written since Miranda was
decided, "a majority of the Court does not believe" that a violation of the
Miranda rules is a violation of the Constitution.'
I shall try to respond to these charges.
A. "There is a world of difference, which the Court
recognized under the traditional voluntariness test but
ignored in Miranda, between compelling a suspect to
incriminate himself and preventing him from foolishly
doing so of his own accord .... Preventing foolish (rather
than compelled) confessions is likewise the only
conceivable basis for [other] rules [suggested in
Miranda]."91
Miranda can be criticized on various grounds, but surely not this one.
Miranda does not prevent anyone from foolishly "volunteering" an
incriminating statement. Miranda leaves the police free to hear and act upon
"volunteered" statements even though the "volunteer" neither knows nor has
been informed of his rights.' (This is so, even if a person has been taken
into custody, so long as the police have not yet begun interrogating him.) 3
Miranda does not prevent anyone from foolishly making an incriminating
statement in response to "[g]eneral on-the-scene questioning as to facts
surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens"9-the kind of
questioning, Miranda tells us, that the police may conduct without advising
anyone of his rights.9" Nor does Miranda prevent anyone from foolishly
making an incriminating statement, even though he is unaware and
uninformed of his rights, when he is being questioned by the police in his
own home or place of business.' 6
89. See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
90. See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
91. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2339 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting).
92. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478 ("Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the
Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by our holding today.").
93. The Miranda warnings "must be given ... when the individual is first subjected to police
interrogation while in custody." Id. at 477. It is police custody plus police interrogation that
requires the Miranda warnings. Thus, as Justice White observed, dissenting in Miranda, an
arrestee "may blurt out a confessions which will be admissible despite the fact that he is alone and
in custody, without any showing that he had any notion of his right to remain silent or of the
consequences of his admission." Id. at 533.
94. ld. at477.
95. 'In such situations," Miranda tells us, "the compelling atmosphere inherent in the
process of in-custody interrogation is not necessarily present." d. at 478.
96. Id. at 478 & n.46.
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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Even when a suspect is incarcerated, Miranda does not prevent him from
foolishly confiding in and confessing to a police officer posing as a fellow-
prisoner. Since "the essential ingredients of a 'police-dominated-atmosphere'
and compulsion are not present when an incarcerated person speaks freely to
someone that he believes to be a fellow inmate,"9 Miranda warnings are not
required in these circumstances.
Finally, and most importantly, even when a suspect is in the interrogation
room and confronting three or four police officers, Miranda does not prevent
him from foolishly waiving his rights and foolishly trying to convince the
police that they may have arrested the wrong person. Indeed, Miranda has
been criticized from the outset for failing to recognize "the improbability, if
not the impossibility, of an intelligent waiver" of one's Miranda rights98 and
for "leaving an opening which predictably meant that the defendant who is
naive, confused, unintelligent or careless would confess to the police while
others would not.""
Justice Scalia's criticism of Miranda is reminiscent of Justice White's
assertion, dissenting in Miranda that "the Court not only prevents the use of
compelled confessions but for all practical purposes forbids interrogation
except in the presence of counsel"-thus unjustifiably "installing counsel as
the arbiter of the [Fifth Amendment] privilege.""°u But more than three
decades have elapsed since Justice White made his dire prediction about
97. Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 296 (1990). The Court went on to say, quite correctly
I believe, that "[c]oercion is determined from the perspective of the suspect" and when "a suspect
considers himself in the company of cellmates and not officers, the coercive atmosphere is lacking."
Id.
98. Richard H. Kuh, Some Vews on Miranda v. Arizona, 35 FORDHAM L. REv. 233, 234-35
(1966). But the prevailing view is, as Chief Judge Weintraub pointed out more than thirty years
ago, that "if a defendant has been given the Miranda warnings, if the coercion of custodial
interrogation was thus dissipated, his 'waiver' was no less 'voluntary' and 'knowing' and
'intelligent' because he misconceived the inculpatory thrust of the facts he admitted, or because he
thought that what he said could not be used because it was only oral .. .or because he could well
have used a lawyer. A man need not have the understanding of a lawyer to waive one." State v.
McKnight, 243 A.2d 240 (N.J. 1968). Consider, too, James I. Tomkovicz, Standards for
Invocation and Waiver of Counsel in Confession Contents, 71 IOWA L. REV. 975, 1049 (1986).
99. Marvin Frankel, From Private Fights to Public Justice, 51 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 516, 529
(1976). Judge Frankel notes that "multitudes of waivers are found to have occurred each year,
despite the fact that any person who knows what he is doing ought to volunteer nothing." Id. at
528. More recently, Chief Judge Posner has observed that those who confess to the police "are not
adept at weighing benefits and costs.... Mhey may think that by explaining their crime from
their own perspective they may convince the police that there were extenuating circumstances
.... " Richard A. Posner, Let Them Tak, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 21, 2000, at 42.
100. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 536-37 (White, J., joined by Harlan, J., and Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
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Miranda's impact and "[e]xperience has shown that Miranda does far less
harm to law enforcement than the Miranda dissenters feared." 0'
Even Paul Cassell, Miranda's harshest critic, who insists that "law
enforcement never recovered from the blow inflicted by Miranda,""2 reports
that slightly less than one out of eight felony suspects who were given the
Miranda warnings invoked their rights before the police were successful in
their interrogation. " Didn't many of the large number of suspects who
declined to assert their Miranda rights act foolishly?
I concur in George Thomas's view that "if the Miranda dissenters and the
police in 1966 had been told that the effect of Miranda would be limited to
12.1 percent of felony suspects, they would have cheered in relief.""
Justice Scalia also maintains that "[p]reventing foolish (rather than
compelled) confessions is likewise the only conceivable basis for the
[Miranda rules] that courts must exclude any confession elicited by
questioning conducted, without interruption, after the suspect has indicated a
desire to stand on his right to remain silent or initiated by police after the
suspect has expressed a desire to have counsel present. "
Being unhappy with Miranda's requirements is one thing. Maintaining
that you cannot conceive of any basis for these requirements other than
"[p]reventing foolish (rather than compelled) confessions" is something else
again.
One need only look at the Miranda opinion itself. It tells us that the
denial of a custodial suspect's request for counsel aggravates "the anxieties
which [the police have] created in the interrogation rooms,""°6 "heighten[s]
[the suspect's] dilemma, [making] his later statements the product of this
compulsion,"" and "undermine[s] his ability to exercise the privilege-to
remain silent if he [chooses] or to speak without any intimidation, blatant or
subtle. "8
One may also look at Arizona v. Roberson" where Justice Stevens,
speaking for six Justices (including Justice Scalia), "0 observed:
101. Dripps, supra note 38, at 54 n.190.
102. Paul G. Cassell, All Benefits, No Costs: The Grand Illusion of Miranda's Defenders, 90
Nw. U. L. REV. 1084,1091-92 (1996).
103. Cassell & Hayman, supra note 55, at 860.
104. George C. Thomas III, Plain Talk About the Miranda Empirical Debate: A 'Steady-
State- Theory of Confessions, 43 UCLA L. REV. 933, 956 (1996). Moreover, it is fair to assume
that even in pre-Miranda days some suspects refused to "cooperate" with the police.
105. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2339 (emphasis added).
106. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 465.
107. Id. at 465-66.
108. Id. at 466.
109. 486 U.S. 675 (1988); see also supra note 36.
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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[T]he prophylactic protections that the Miranda warnings provide
to counteract the "inherently compelling pressure" of custodial
interrogation and to "permit a full opportunity to exercise the
privilege against self-incrimination" ... are implemented by the
application of the Edwards [v. Arizona]... corollary that if a suspect
believes that he is not capable of undergoing such questioning
without advice of counsel, then it is presumed that any subsequent
waiver that has come at the authorities' behest, and not at the
suspect's own instigation, is itself the product of the "inherently
compelling pressures" and not the purely voluntary choice of the
suspect. As Justice White has explained, "the accused having
expressed his own view that he is not competent to deal with the
authorities without legal advice, a later decision at the authorities'
insistence to make a statement without counsel's presence may
properly be viewed with skepticism."" 2
B. "[What is most remarkable about the Miranda decision-
and what made it unacceptable as a matter of
straightforward constitutional interpretation in the
Marbury [v. Madison]t" 3 tradition-is its palpable hostility
toward the act of confession per se, rather than toward
what the Constitution abhors, compelled confession."" 4
As we have already seen, Miranda left the police much more leeway than
many people including Justice Scalia, seem to realize. Justice Scalia's talk
about Miranda's "palpable hostility toward the act of confession per se"
makes me wonder whether he has confused Miranda with Escobedo v.
Illinois, " the case which preceded it by two years. Miranda was argued
against, and can best be understood against, the background of Escobedo. A
comparison of the two cases reveals that Escobedo posed a much greater
threat to police interrogation, as it had been conducted up to that point, than
did Miranda.
110. Justice O'Connor took no part in this case. Newly appointed Justice Kennedy, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented. Two years later, however, Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion
of the Court in Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990). This time Justice Scalia, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented. For a brief discussion of Minnick, see supra note 36.
111. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
112. Roberson, 486 U.S. at 681 (referring to Edwards v. Arizona, 457 U.S. 477 (1981),
discussed supra note 36).
113. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
114. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2339 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting) (first
emphasis added).
115. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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In Escobedo, the Court extended the right to counsel to the pre-indictment
stage, but it was unclear whether this right came into play "when the process
shifts from investigatory to accusatory-when its focus is on the accused and
its purpose it to elicit a confession"" 6-or when the process so shifts and one
or more of the limiting facts in Escobedo are also present."1
7
Although Escobedo grew out of an atypical fact situation and arguably
could be limited to these special facts," 8 the opinion had broad implications
and at some places contained sweeping language-language which troubled
most law enforcement officials and many members of the bench and bar."9
Thus, on the eve of Miranda, a case that was to reexamine Escobedo and to
clarify its meaning and scope, a number of prominent judges spoke publicly
in anticipation of the Court's ruling, urging it to reconsider where it seemed
to be going.
For example, two of the nation's most highly regarded state judges,
Walter Schaefer and Roger Traynor, voiced concern that the reasoning in
Escobedo, if pushed to its logical conclusion, could lead to the end of police
interrogation.'" And Judge Henry Friendly warned that "condition[ing]
questioning on the presence of counsel is ... really saying that there may be
no effective, immediate questioning by the police"-"a rule that society will
not long endure."121
116. Id. at 492.
117. For a summary of the wide disagreement over the meaning of Escobedo-and over what
it ought to mean-see YALE KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN
LAW AND POLICY 161-62 (1980).
118. Mr. Escobedo had hired a lawyer and met with him some days earlier. On the night
Escobedo confessed, his lawyer had arrived in the stationhouse and had tried unsuccessfully to meet
with him. Moreover, although not advised of his right to counsel, Mr. Escobedo had requested an
opportunity to meet with his lawyer, a request that was denied.
119. For example, at one point, Justice Goldberg, speaking for a 5-4 majority, observed: "We
have learned the lesson of history ... that a system of criminal law enforcement which comes to
depend on the 'confession' will, in the long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses than a
system which depends on extrinsic evidence independently secured through skillful investigation."
Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 488-49.
As a close student of the Warren Court recently noted, "Goldberg's opinion for the liberals
made explicit their total disdain for confessions and perhaps for modem law enforcement as well.
Escobedo was a slap in the face of American police by a sharply divided 5-4 Court." LUCAS A.
POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLmcs 389 (2000).
120. WALTER V. SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY 9 (1967) (based on lectures
delivered before Miranda); Roger Traynor, The Devils of Due Process in Criminal Detection,
Detention, and ThaI 657, 669 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 657, 669 (1966) (based on pre-Miranda lecture).
Similar fears were expressed by another well-respected state judge. Charles D. Breitel, Criminal
Law and Equal Justice, 1966 UTAH L. REV. 1 (based on pre-Miranda lecture).
121. Forty-Third Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute, 1966 A.L.I. PRoC. 250
(remarks made a month before Miranda )(emphasis added); see also Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of
Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CAL. L. REV. 929 (1965).
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Miranda did not hand down the opinion that these judges, and many other
Court-watchers, had anticipated and feared. The Court did not flatly prohibit
police questioning of suspects. Nor did it condition such questioning on the
presence of counsel. Neither did it require that a suspect be advised of his
rights by a defense lawyer or by a disinterested magistrate before agreeing to
talk to the police.
The Warren Court "could have developed Escobedo into a doctrine ...
mandating that no waiver of rights would be accepted unless the accused had
first consulted with counsel."'2 But Miranda cut off that possibility. It did
so by continuing to move in the same general direction but "switching
tracks"-moving from a right to counsel rationale to a self-incrimination
rationale, one which allowed the police more room to maneuver. A right to
counsel rationale had almost no stopping point, but a self-incrimination
rationale did-it required governmental compulsion.
As Justice O'Connor, speaking for six Justices (including Chief Justice
Burger and soon-to-be Chief Justice Rehnquist), pointed out twenty years
after Miranda, the case "attempted to reconcile" two "opposing concerns"-
the need for police questioning as an effective law enforcement tool and the
need to protect custodial suspects from impermissible coercion.2' As Justice
O'Connor also reminded us that day, rejecting "the more extreme position
that the actual presence of a lawyer was necessary to dispel the coercion
inherent in custodial interrogation,"" 4 the Miranda Court permitted police
interrogation to "continue in its traditional form ... but only if the suspect
clearly understood that at any time, he could bring the proceedings to a halt
or, short of that, call in an attorney."" 5
One may not share the Burbine majority's view that Miranda "embodies a
carefully crafted balance designed to fully protect both the defendant's and
society's interests."" 6 One may prefer Judge Frankel's less generous
assessment-Miranda only achieved "a tense, temporary, ragged truce
between combatants."27 But the Miranda Court would not have struggled to
122. Laurence A. Benner, Requiem for Miranda.: The Rehnquist Court's Voluntariness
Doctrine in Historical Perspective, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 59, 160 (1989).
Shortly after Escobedo, two commentators worried whether the Court might be in the process
of shaping "a novel right not to confess except knowingly and with the tactical assistance of
counsel." Arnold Enker & Sheldon Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and
Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 MINN. L. REV. 47, 60-61, 69, 83 (1964).
123. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986).
124. Id. at 426; see also supra text accompanying notes 48-49.
125. Moran, 475 U.S. at 426-27.
126. Id. at 433 n.4.
127. Frankel, supra note 99, at 526.
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reach a "compromise" or (if one prefers) a "ragged truce" if, as Justice
Scalia claims, it had a palpable hostility toward the act of confession per se."
C. "One will search today's opinion in vain, however, for a
statement (surely simple enough to make) that what 18
U.S.C. § 3501 prescribes-the use at trial of a voluntary
confession, even when a Miranda warning or its
equivalent has failed to be given-violates the
Constitution...."
"It takes only a small step to bring today's opinion
out of the realm of power-judging and into the
mainstream of legal reasoning: The Court need only ...
come out and say quite dearly: 'We reaffirm today that
custodial interrogation that is not preceded by Miranda
warnings or their equivalent violates the Constitution of
the United States.' It cannot say that because a majority
of the Court does not believe it."'
I think the Court did say it. To be sure, Chief Justice Rehnquist did not
use the exact words that Justice Scalia would have liked (not any more than
dissenting Justice Scalia used the exact words the Chief Justice would have
liked), but he said it. He did not say it Justice Scalia's way. He said it in his
own way (just as Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion in his own way),
but he said it.
I do not believe that anyone who studies the Dickerson majority opinion
can come away with any doubt that what the Court told us is, to quote Justice
Scalia, that "what 18 U.S.C. § 3501 prescribes-the use at trial of a
voluntary confession, even when a Miranda warning or its equivalent has
failed to be given-violates the Constitution.""'
In light of the way the Court seems to have "deconstitutionalized"
Miranda in several previous decisions, why the Court invalidated § 3501 may
be somewhat baffling.'30 And how it could bring itself to do so may be too.
128. Dickerson, 120 U.S. at 2337 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting). As Proftssor
David Strauss points out, technically this formulation "is incorrect because even under Miranda,
what the Constitution prohibits is the admission into evidence of statements obtained by custodial
interrogation without warnings. It seems doubtful that questioning a suspect in custody without
warnings would violate the Constitution if the statements were never used as evidence, unless the
interrogation were in some other way abusive." Strauss, supra note 68, at 2 n.4.
129. See supra text accompanying note 128.
130. Because of the way he or she may have characterized Miranda in previous cases, one or
more members of the Dickerson majority, or perhaps the Chief Justice himself, may have been
uncomfortable with the precise wording Justice Scalia challenged the majority to use. Another
[Ariz. St. L.J.408
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But there is nothing enigmatic about what the Court said with respect to §
3501.
After voicing its agreement with the court below that when it enacted §
3501 Congress intended or purported to overrule Miranda, the Court
reminds us that "Congress may not legislatively supersede our decisions
interpreting and applying the Constitution."' 3' Thus, the case "turns on
whether the Miranda Court announced a constitutional rule."" Four pages
later, the Court "conclude[s]" that it did-that "Miranda announced a
constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively. "'33 Along
the way the Court furnishes various reasons why "Miranda is a constitutional
decision"-"first and foremost" because "both Miranda and two of its
companion cases applied the rule to proceedings in state courts"' 3 and "[it]
is beyond dispute that we do not hold a supervisory power over the courts of
the several States. " '31
In the course of rejecting an argument that § 3501, together with other
remedies now available for abusive police misconduct,'3 provides a suitable
alternative to the Miranda warnings, 37 the Court tells us once again that §
3501 violates the Constitution: "a legislative alternative to Miranda" must be
"equally as effective in preventing coerced confessions"'13 and § 3501 is
not. 139 Even when taken together with the remedies for police misconduct
cited by defenders of § 3501, the statute falls short of "the constitutional
minimum. " "
Justice Scalia also maintains that the Court never says, and "cannot say"
because it does not believe it, that "custodial interrogation ... not preceded
by Miranda warnings or their equivalent violates the Constitution of the
United States."' 4' I think the language quoted above proves the contrary,
although once again the Court does not use the precise wording Justice Scalia
would prefer.
possibility is that having written and been satisfied with a draft opinion, the Chief Justice simply
resisted adopting the words and phrases Justice Scalia challenged him to use. Who tells Justice
Scalia what words or phrases he should use in his opinions?
131. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2332.
132. Id. at 2333.
133. Id. at 2336.
134. Id. at 2333.
135.. d.
136. For example, a suspect may now bring a federal cause of action under the Due Process
Clause for police misconduct during custodial interrogation.
137. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2333.
138. Id.
139. See id. at 2335.
140. Id.
141. See supra text accompanying note 128.
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If more language from the opinion of the Court is needed, consider the
following: The Dickerson Court tells us that the Miranda Court "concluded
that something more than the totality test [totality-of-circumstances or
voluntariness test] was necessary" to satisfy the Fifth Amendment privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination. 42 However, § 3501 does not provide
anything more. It neither requires the Miranda warnings (not any of them)
nor any suitable substitute; it simply reinstates the totality test. "Section
3501 therefore cannot be sustained if Miranda is to remain the law"m-and
Miranda is to so remain.
D. "[Dickerson means] that this Court has the power, not
merely to apply the Constitution but to expand it,
imposing what it regards as useful 'prophylactic'
restrictions upon Congress and the States. This is an
immense and frightening antidemocratic power, and it
does not exist." .
[A]dopting prophylactic rules to buttress
constitutional rights, and enforcing them against
Congress and the States.... is in my view a lawless
practice ....
"... [W]hat today's decision will stand for,
whether the Justices can bring themselves to say it or not,
is the power of the Supreme Court to write a
prophylactic, extraconstitutional Constitution, binding on
Congress and the States."
"Thus, while I agree with the Court that § 3501
cannot be upheld without also concluding that Miranda
represents an illegitimate exercise of our authority to
142. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2335.
143. Id. at 2336.
144. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2337 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, ., dissenting).
145. Id. at 2343-44 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting).
410 [Ariz. St. L.J.
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review state-court judgments, I do not share the Court's
hesitation in reaching that conclusion."
4
'
A "prophylactic rule" has been defined as a rule that "does not announce
a requirement mandated by the underlying constitutional provision, but a
requirement adopted in the Court's exercise of its authority to draft remedies
and procedures that facilitate its adjudicatory responsibility."47 Justice
Scalia's criticism of Miranda's "prophylactic rules," and the Court's
146. Id. at 2346 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting).
147. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §
2.9(e), at 673-74 (2d ed. 1999). Professor Klein offers a somewhat different definition: "A
'constitutional prophylactic rule' is a judicially-created doctrinal rule or legal requirement" which
the Court deems "appropriate for determining whether an explicit or 'true' federal constitutional
rule is applicable. It may be triggered by less than a showing that the explicit rule was violated, but
provides the same result as a showing that the explicit rule was violated." Klein, supra note 38, at
5. Such a rule is appropriate, adds Professor Klein "only upon two determinations. First, that
simply providing relief upon a showing that the explicit right was violated is ineffective. Second,
that use of this rule will be more effective and involve only acceptable costs." Id. Another
commentator, Brian K. Landsberg, uses the term "to refer to those risk-avoidance rules that are not
directly sanctioned or required by the Constitution, but that are adopted to ensure that the
government follows constitutionally sanctioned or required rules. They are directed against the risk
of noncompliance with a constitutional norm." Brian K. Landsberg, Safeguarding Constiutional
Rights: The Uses and Limits of Prophylactic Rules, 66 TENN. L. REV. 925, 926 (1999), To avoid
lumping all kinds of risk-avoidance rules together, Professor Landsberg would put only "rights-
protective-risk-avoidance rules" in the "prophylactic rules" category. Id. at 928.
Joseph Grano, who called a good deal of attention to this subject a decade and a half ago when
he launched a major assault on the legitimacy of prophylactic rules generally and the Miranda
doctrine specifically, see generally Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A
Question of Article 11 Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 100 (1985), defines a prophylactic rule as
one that "functions as a preventive safeguard to insure that constitutional violations will not occur."
Id. at 105 (emphasis added). Similarly, Professors LaFave, Israel and King tell us that a
prophylactic rule is "designed to operate as a preventative measure; its purpose is to safeguard
against a potential constitutional violation, rather than to identify what constitutes a constitutional
violation." LAFAVE, ISRAEL AND KING, supra, § 2.9(e), at 672-73. However, the Miranda rules
seem designed to perform both functions. See infra note 217 (discussing per se and prophylactic
rules). Thus, I prefer Susan Klein's definition: "A prophylactic rule is a standard for government
behavior designed to reduce violations or make alleged violations easier to adjudicate." Klein,
supra note 38, at 6 (emphasis added).
Finally, whiat about the exclusionary sanction for a violation of the Fourth Amendment?
LaFave, Israel & King put it in the 'prophylactic rule" category. LAFAVE, ISRAEL & KING, supra,
§ 2.9(e), at 673-75. However, I think that, although it is a first cousin to rules like Miranda, the
search and seizure exclusionary rule is sufficiently different to warrant a separate category.
Professor Klein does, so, calling the exclusionary rule a "constitutional incidental right." Klein,
supra note 38, at 6. Such a right is "a judicially -created procedure determined by the Court as the
appropriate relief for the violation of an explicit or 'true' constitutional rule." Id. The distinction
between prophylactic rights and incidental rights is that the latter are "what the court provides after
the violation has already occurred .... If the prophylactic rule works, there will be no violation
and no incidental right offered." Id.; see also Landsberg, supra, at 971.
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promulgation of such rules generally, as "illegitimate" and "lawless" was not
unexpected."4 But it is hard to reconcile what he said in Dickerson with the
Court's treatment of "prophylactic rules" only six months earlier in Smith v.
Robbins.49 (Justice Scalia joined Justice Thomas's opinion of the Court in
that case.)
1. The Significance of Smith v. Robbins
How may counsel appointed to represent an indigent defendant on appeal
withdraw from the case? Some thirty years ago, in Anders v. California,'"
the Court found constitutionally defective a state procedure which permitted
appointed appellate counsel to withdraw simply by filing a conclusory letter
stating the appeal had "no merit," a procedure which allowed the appellate
court, without further briefing, to examine the record and to affirm the
judgment. The Anders Court then established what was later called "'a
prophylactic framework' [designed to] vindicate [an indigent defendant's]
constitutional right to appellate counsel. ""' Under the Anders procedure, a
lawyer's request to withdraw from the appeal had to be "accompanied by a
brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the
appeal." 15
2
Last year, in Robbins, the Court had to consider the constitutionality of a
new California procedure for dealing with potentially frivolous appeals.
Under this procedure, court-appointed counsel did not have to file a brief
referring to any arguable point, but, inter alia, did have to file a brief
"summariz[ing] the procedural and factual history of the case, with citations
of the record."' The Court upheld the new California system, pointing out
that the states are free to adopt procedures other than the one set forth in the
Anders case so long as the procedure "reasonably ensures [as did the
challenged new California procedure] that an indigent's appeal will be
resolved in a way that is related to the merit of that appeal.""'4
148. Dissenting in Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 156 (1990). Justice Scalia had called
for the sharp containment of the Edwards "prophylactic rule," see supra note 36 (discussing
Edwards), and only assumed for purposes of discussing the Court's authority to adopt prophylactic
rules, see Minnick, 498 U.S. at 161. Concurring in Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 464
(1994), Justice Scalia had chided the Justice Department for repeatedly refusing to invoke § 3501.
149. 120 S. Ct. 746 (2000).
150. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
151. Robbins, 120 S. Ct. at 757 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987)).
152. Anders, 386 U.S. at 744.
153. Robbins, 120 S. Ct. at 753.
154. Id. at760.
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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Anders does impose some constraints on Congress and the states.
Although they are free to devise suitable substitutes for Anders (just as the
Miranda Court repeatedly told Congress and the states they are free to do the
same for the Miranda warnings), neither Congress nor the states are free to
turn the clock back to the early 1960s. They cannot scrap the Anders
procedure and replace it with the same old California procedure that was
condemned in Anders. In other words, court rules or state legislation that
treated Anders the same way that § 3501 treated Miranda would not survive
Supreme Court review.
In his Dickerson dissent, Justice Scalia seems to think that Robbins has no
bearing on the controversy over the legality of prophylactic rules. He points
out that the case "upheld a procedure different from the one Anders
suggested."' 5 But the Court would not have upheld any and every procedure
that replaced Anders. The only reason the Court upheld a different method
for satisfying constitutional requirements for indigent criminal appeals than
the prophylactic rules adopted in Anders was that it considered the different
method an adequate alternative to Anders. If the different method had turned
out to be nothing more, or no better than, the very procedure disapproved in
Anders, then, just as Dickerson invalidated § 3501 (which offered nothing
more than the test for admitting confessions found inadequate in Miranda),
Robbins would have struck down the new procedure for handling indigent
criminal appeals.
At one point, Justice Scalia suggests he believes that Robbins cuts his
way: "[A]s we made clear ... in [Robbins], ... the benchmark of
constitutionality is the constitutional requirement of adequate representation,
and not some excrescence upon the requirement decreed, for safety's sake,
by this Court. " 56
But the "benchmark of constitutionality" in Miranda is not the Miranda
warnings, not any more than the "benchmark" in Anders is the set of specific
procedures sketched in that case. The "benchmark of constitutionality" in
Miranda can be stated in various ways, some short, some a bit long-winded:
Now that the privilege against self-incrimination has been held applicable to
custodial interrogation, the traditional case-by-case voluntariness test falls
short of the constitutional minimum and-
(a) some system of procedural safeguards (the Miranda warnings or
some equally effective alternative) is necessary to protect the
privilege; or
155. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2344 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
156. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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(b) some "adequate protective devices" must be "employed to dispel
the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings"; ' or
(c) some safeguards must be utilized that assure "real understanding
and intelligent exercise of the privilege"'"" and assure that "the
individual's right to choose between silence and speech remains
unfettered throughout the interrogation process";'59 or
(d) "suspects have a constitutional right to some procedures that are
adequate to inform them of the right to remain silent in the face of
custodial interrogation, and a constitutional right to procedures that
provide a continuous opportunity to exercise the right to remain
silent. 60
Section 3501 was not invalidated because it failed to comply with
Miranda's prophylactic rules. It was struck down rather because it failed to
satisfy the "benchmark of constitutionality" established in Miranda-it failed
to provide anything more than the "totality of circumstances"-
"voluntariness" test when the Court made plain that "something more than
the totality test was necessary"' 6 -it failed to provide any safeguard against
the inherently compelling circumstances of custodial interrogation other than
the test that had been found wanting in Miranda.
Robbins supports and helps explain Dickerson. Nowhere in its majority
opinion does the Robbins Court suggest that the prophylactic rules prescribed
in Anders were "illegitimate" or "lawless." Nor does Robbins suggest that
the Congress or the States could disregard the Anders rules with impunity
simply because they were "prophylactic." The new California procedure
was upheld only because it was a suitable substitute for Anders-it
"reasonably ensures that an indigent's appeal will be resolved in a way that is
related to the merit of that appeal."" But § 3501 does not reasonably
157. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458; see aLso Schulhofer, Reconsidering, supra note 26, at 436.
158. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469.
159. Id.
160. According to Dorf & Friedman, Miranda and Dickerson stand for this proposition. Dorf
& Friedman, supra note 22, at 3-4; see also David Huitema, Miranda: Legitimate Response to
Contingent Requirements of the Fifth Amendment, 18 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 261, 263, 290
(2000).
161. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2335 (emphasis added).
162. See Smith v. Robbins, 120 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2000).
414 [Ariz. St. L.J.
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ensure that the exercise of a custodial suspect's right to remain silent will be
honored.'63
The Robbins Court pointed out that, although the California procedure it
was upholding was different than the one prescribed in Anders, it is
"undoubtably far better than those procedures we have found inadequate.""
Once again, this cannot be said of § 3501. In fact, § 3501 is a statutory
codification of the same test the Court found wanting in Miranda-and
nowhere in his long dissenting opinion in Dickerson does Justice Scalia
argue, or even suggest, otherwise.
2. Edwards and its Progeny
Edwards v. Arizona'5 marked the rare occasion when the Burger Court
read Miranda rather broadly. In an opinion by Justice White (who had
written a stinging dissent in Miranda) the Court held that when a suspect
effectively asserts his right to a lawyer (as opposed to his right to remain
silent),'" the suspect may not be subjected to further police questioning until
counsel has been made available to him unless he himself initiates further
conversation with the police. Edwards in effect established a new
"prophylactic rule" that built on and reinforced Miranda's "prophylactic
rules." 6 7
What the Burger Court promulgated, the Rehnquist Court reaffirmed and
expanded. In Minnick v. Mississippi'" (a case that applied the Edwards rule
even when the suspect had been allowed to meet with a lawyer after first
163. As pointed out in Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2335:
Miranda requires procedures that will warn a suspect in custody of his right to
remain silent and which will assure that the exercise of that right will be
honored. [But] § 3501 explicitly eschews a requirement of pre-interrogation
warnings in favor of an approach that looks to the administration of such
warnings as only one factor in determining the voluntariness of a suspect's
confession.
164. Robbins, 120 S. Ct. at 761.
165. 451 U.S. 477 (1981); see also supra note 36. There were no dissents in Edwards.
Justice Powell, joined by then-Justice Rehnquist, who concurred in the result did balk at the
prospect of "creat[ing a new per se rule" in the confessions area, Edwards, 451 U.S. at 489-90,
but did so on policy grounds. Chief Justice Burger also concurred in the judgment. No member of
the Court even hinted that the Edwards rule was an "illegitimate" exercise of the Court's power.
166. See Michigan v. Mosley, 433 U.S. 96 (1975).
167. The Edwards opinion itself did not describe its rule as a "prophylactic" one. (Neither, it
should be noted, did the Miranda opinion itself describe the Miranda warnings as prophylactic
rules.) However, in Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988), which reaffirmed and expanded
Edwards, the Court referred to "the bright-line, prophylactic Edwards rule," id. at 682, and the
"prophylactic rule" laid down in Edwards, id. at 685.
168. 498 U.S. 146 (1990).
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asserting his right to counsel) a 6-2 majority,'9 per Justice Kennedy,
observed:
The [Edwards] rule ensures that any statement made [by a suspect
who has previously asserted his right to counsel] is not the result of
coercive pressures. Edwards conserves judicial resources which
would otherwise be expended in making difficult determinations of
voluntariness and implements the protection of Miranda in practical
and straightforward terms.17
Is this not an explanation and defense of Miranda itself as well as
Edwards?
A "prophylactic rule" in the confessions area promulgated by the Burger
Court and twice reaffirmed and expanded by the Rehnquist Court should give
anyone heaping scorn on the Warren Court's use of prophylactic rules reason
to pause. But Justice Scalia barely mentions the Edwards rule. He dismisses
Edwards and cases based on it in a footnote as marking "less a separate
instance of claimed judicial power to impose constitutional prophylaxis than a
direct, logic-driven consequence of Miranda itself."""'
I think not. I think it is hard to say that the Edwards rule was required by
the Miranda decision. After all, six years prior to Edwards, the Court had
held that if a suspect asserts his "right to silence" (as opposed to his right to
counsel) the police could, if they ceased questioning on the spot, "try
again"-and succeed at a subsequent interrogation session. " The Court
could have plausibly held that assertion of the right to counsel should be
treated no differently than invocation of the right to silence. '7 Indeed, as I
have mentioned elsewhere, I do not think it makes much sense to draw a
distinction based on which right a suspect happens to invoke. 174
It seems clear to me, and, more important, it seemed clear to Justice
White (speaking about Edwards three years after he wrote the majority
opinion in that case) that "Edwards was not a necessary consequence of
169. Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented. Justice Souter took no part
in the case.
170. Minnick, 498 U.S. at 151.
171. Dickerson, 120S. Ct. at 2345 n.I.
172. See Michigan v. Mosley, 433 U.S. 96 (1975).
173. In Solem v. Stwnes, 465 U.S. 638 (1984), holding that Edwards does not apply
retroactively to state-court convictions affirmed by the state supreme court before Edwards was
decided, the Court, per Justice White (author of the Edwards opinion), pointed out that "much of
the logic and language" of Mosley, which had refused to adopt aper se rule governing the waiver of
the right to silence, "could be applied to the invocation of the [right to counsel]." Id. at 648.
Thus, "Edwards was not a necessary consequence of Miranda." Id.
174. JESSE H. CHOPER, YALE KAMISAR & LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE SUPREME COURT:
TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 1982-83, at 153-58 (1984) (remarks of Kamisar).
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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Miranda."' And the cases expanding the Edwards rule are certainly not, as
Justice Scalia put it in Dickerson, "logic-driven consequences of Miranda."
Miranda did not require a 6-2 majority in Arizona v. Roberson76 to hold
that once a suspect effectively asserts his right to counsel, the police cannot
even initiate interrogation about crimes unrelated to the one for which the
suspect has invoked his right to counsel. Nor did Miranda require a 6-2
majority in Minnick'" to hold that once a suspect invokes his right to counsel
the police may not reinitiate questioning in the absence of counsel even if the
suspect has been allowed to consult with an attorney in the interim.' In
short, as Justice Scalia himself observed a decade ago, "'the rule of Edwards
is our rule, not a constitutional command; and it is our obligation to justify
its expansion.'"'
It is understandable why Justice Scalia is reluctant to consider Edwards,
Roberson and Minnick "separate instance[s] of claimed judicial power to
impose constitutional prophylaxis." Are we supposed to believe that Justice
White (and the five other Justices who joined his opinion in Edwards),
Justice Stevens (and the five other Justices who joined his opinion in
Roberson) and Justice Kennedy (and the five other Justices who joined his
opinion in Minnick) all exercised "an immense and frightening
antidemocratic power [that] does not exist"?se
3. Pearce and its Progeny
One line of cases that Justice Scalia takes head-on is North Carolina v.
Pearce'' and its progeny. Agreeing that defenders of Miranda are "right on
175. See supra note 173. Moreover, at the time Edwards was decided, concurring Justice
Powell stated that the Court had "created a new per se rule in the confessions area," Edwards v.
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 489-90 (1981).
176. 486 U.S. 675 (1988); see also supra note 36. No Justice (including Justice Scalia, who
joined the opinion of the Court) questioned the legitimacy of the Court's exercise of power in
Roberson. Yet Justice Stevens, who wrote the opinion of the Court, spoke freely of the
"prophylactic protections" provided by Miranda and the "prophylactic Edwards rule." Roberson,
486 U.S. at 681-82.
177. When Minnick was decided, not a single member of the original Miranda majority
remained on the Court.
178. As I have observed elsewhere, I believe even some members of the Miranda majority
"would have balked at the application of the Edwards rule to the Minnick fact situation." Yale
Kamisar, The Warren Court and Criminal Justice: A Quarter-Century Retrospective, 31 TULSA L.J.
1, 19 (1995).
179. Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 156 (1990) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) (quoting with approval Justice Kennedy's dissent in Roberson).
180. See spra text accompanying note 144.
181. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
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target"'" when they characterize Pearce as a "prophylactic rules" case,
Justice Scalia directs heavy fire at it, maintaining that it "exhibits the same
fundamental flaw as does Miranda. ""s I believe, however, that the Pearce
line of cases demonstrates (a) that most Justices are fairly comfortable with
prophylactic rules and (b) there are circumstances when such rules are both
necessary and proper.
Pearce arose against the following background: A number of defendants
had successfully overturned their original convictions only to receive a
heavier sentence for the same crime when they were retried and reconvicted.
There was reason to believe that in some of these cases, at least, sentencing
judges were "punishing" defendants for having succeeded in getting their
first convictions set aside. As the Pearce Court noted, however "[t]he
existence of a retaliatory motivation would ... be extremely difficult to
prove in any individual case.'"
The Pearce Court dealt with the problem by establishing what has "since
come to be called a 'presumption of vindictiveness'":ss "In order to assure
the absence of [a retaliatory] motivation" it held that "whenever a judge
imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new trial, the
reasons [for] doing so must affirmatively appear [and] must be based upon
objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the
defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding.""
According to Justice Scalia, "Justice Black surely had the right idea when
he derided the Court's requirement as 'pure legislation if there ever was
legislation.'""' But Justice Black was the only member of the Court to
182. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2345.
183. Id.
184. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725 n.20 (1969).
185. CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 814 (4th
ed. 2000).
186. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726.
187. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2345 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Pearce, 395 U.S. at 741
(Black, J., dissenting)). Justice Black will long be remembered for his stirring opinions in the First
Amendment area, but he was quick to state or to imply that his colleagues were exceeding their
constitutional authority. See, e.g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 407 (1964) (Black, J., joined
by Clark, J., dissenting) ("My wide difference with the Court is in its apparent authority to change
state trial procedure because of its belief that they are unfair"; "Ithere is no constitutional
provision, which gives this Court any such lawmaking power"); Linkletter v. Warden, 381 U.S.
618 (1965) (Black, J., joined by Douglas, J., dissenting) (stating that if, as the Court maintains, a
principal reason for deciding to give Mapp v. Ohio retroactive effect is that the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule is primarily designed to deter future police misconduct, "the Court's action in
adopting the [exclusionary rule] sounds much more like law-making than construing the
Constitution"); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 77, 88 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe use
of the keyword 'privacy'" enables the Court "both to usurp the policy-making power of the
Congress and to hold more [laws] unconstitutional when the Court entertains a sufficient hostility to
418 [Ariz. St. L.J.
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question the legitimacy of a "presumption of vindictiveness." And when
Justice Black left the Court nobody else raised doubts about the legitimacy of
the Pearce prophylactic rules.
The Court subsequently made plain that Pearce had established a
"prophylactic rule" and that such rules are nothing to be uneasy about.
Speaking for a 7-2 majority (one that included Chief Justice Burger and then-
Justice Rehnquist), Justice White explained Pearce as a case where,
"[p]ositing that a more severe penalty after reconviction would violate due
process [if] imposed as purposeful punishment for having successfully
appealed," the Court concluded that "such untoward sentences occurred with
sufficient frequency to warrant the imposition of a prophylactic rule." "'
A year later, speaking for a 7-2 majority that again included Burger and
Rehnquist, Justice Powell (who, so far as I know, has never been called an
admirer of the Warren Court's revolution in criminal procedure), felt so
comfortable with Miranda's prophylactic rules that he explained and
defended "the Pearce prophylactic rules" by analogizing them to the
Miranda rules:
By eliminating the possibility that [improper considerations] might
occasion enhanced sentences, the Pearce prophylactic rules assist
in guaranteeing the propriety of the sentencing phase of the
criminal process. In this protective role, Pearce is analogous to
Miranda, ... where the Court established rules to govern police
practices during custodial interrogations in order to safeguard the
rights of the accused and to assure the reliability of statements
made during these interrogations. Thus, the prophylactic rule in
Pearce and Miranda are similar in that each was designed to
preserve the integrity of a phase of the criminal process.'"'
them"; the permissibility of electronic eavesdropping "is plainly the type of question that can and
should be decided by legislative bodies"); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 364-66, 373 (1967)
(Black, J., dissenting) (stating that the Fourth Amendment "simply does not apply to
eavesdropping," but the Court has gone ahead and applied it by "arbitrarily substituting" its own
language "for the Constitutional language," forgetting that it is not the Court's role "to rewrite the
Amendment 'in order to bring it into harmony with the times'"); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 377,
2381-82 (1970) (Black J., dissenting) (Although "nowhere in [the Constitution] is there any
statement that convictions of crime requires proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt," the Court so
finds; its "natural law due process" approach to constitutional interpretation leads to "an arrogation
of unlimited authority by the judiciary [that] cannot be supported by the language or the history of
any provision of the Constitution."). However, Justice Black's criticism of other Justices for going
beyond the text of the Constitution and usurping the power of the legislature is hard to square with
his concurring opinion in New York 7Tmues v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See infra text
accompanying notes 204-10.
188. Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 116 (1972) (emphasis added).
189. Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 53 (1973).
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Justice Powell and the six Justices who joined him seemed untroubled by
the fact that in many instances application of the Pearce rule would benefit
defendants-whose rights had not actually been violated-who had not actually
been the victims of vindictiveness. " This was a good reason for not
applying Pearce retroactively to resentencing proceedings that took place
prior to the Pearce decision' (just as Miranda had not been applied
retroactively), I" but it was not a valid reason for failing to adopt the rule. It
is "an inherent attribute of prophylactic constitutional rules" that their
application will benefit "some defendants who have suffered no constitutional
deprivation.""9
In still another case applying Pearce, even Chief Justice Burger seemed
unperturbed by its "prophylactic" nature. Speaking for a majority of the
Court that included Justice Rehnquist, the Chief Justice matter of factly
recalled that in order "[t]o prevent actual vindictiveness from entering into a
decision and allay any fear on the part of a defendant that an increased
sentence is in fact the product of vindictiveness, the [Pearce] Court fashioned
what in essence is a 'prophylactic rule.'"'" But the Court did not say this
disapprovingly.
Neither the Chief Justice nor any other member of the Court complained
that the Pearce rule had enabled federal courts to exercise their "supervisory
power over state courts." Nobody seemed troubled that a defendant who had
received an increased sentence on retrial could establish a due process
violation without showing actual vindictiveness. Nor did anybody suggest
that Pearce was an "illegitimate" decision.
Would Justice Scalia have us believe that all these years all these Justices
engaged in "lawless practices"?
Dissenting in Dickerson, Justice Scalia maintains that "although the Due
Process Clause may well prohibit punishment based on judicial
vindictiveness, the Constitution by no means vests in the courts 'any general
power to prescribe particular devices "in order to assure the absence of such
a motivation."'"'" But what good does it do to say that judicial
vindictiveness is unconstitutional if there is no way to prove it? No way to
make that prohibition meaningful?
190. See id. at 53-54.
191. The Court held that Pearce would not apply retroactively in Payne. Id. at 57.
192. See Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
193. Payne, 412 U.S. at 53.
194. Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 564 (1984).
195. Dickerion, 120 S. Ct. at 2345 (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 741
(1969) (Black, J., dissenting)).
420 [Ariz. St. L.J.
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Establishing that a sentencing judge was motivated by bad faith or bias is
a Herculean feat. Judges who are so motivated are not likely to admit it.
Suppose Pearce had taken Justice Scalia's position and declared that although
vindictive sentencing is unconstitutional the Court lacks any power to
prescribe particular devices in order to assure that such sentencing did not
occur. Then what? When a judge imposed a heavier sentence on a
defendant reconvicted for the same crime, the defendant would claim that the
judge "punished" him for getting his first conviction overturned and the
judge would deny it. Then what?
At one point in his Dickerson dissent Justice Scalia maintains that there is
"simply no basis in reason" for concluding that a response by a suspect "who
already knows all of the rights described in the Miranda warning" is
anything but a "volitional act." But how can we tell whether a suspect
already knows all the rights described in the Miranda warnings if the police
are not required to inform him, and do not inform him, of his "Miranda
rights"? To be sure, the custodial suspect might be a judge or a lawyer or a
police officer. But that still leaves about ninety-eight percent of the cases.
And in those cases the suspect will say he did not know all of his rights (or
that he forgot some or all of them under stress or in the excitement) and the
prosecution will insist that he was fully aware of his rights at all times. Then
what?
4. The Instructiveness of New York Times v. Sullivan
As Susan Klein has recently spelled out, constitutional-criminal procedure
is filled with prophylactic rules."9 As David Strauss has shown, however,
criminal procedure has no monopoly on such rules."9 New York Times v.
Sullivan'" is a noteworthy example.
I realize that in Dickerson Justice Scalia dismissed Sullivan and other First
Amendment decisions cited by defenders of Miranda as cases that engaged in
straightforward constitutional interpretation.'" But it is no easy task to
decide whether Supreme Court rulings are prophylactic, especially when the
opinions do not tell us (as Miranda, Edwards, Pearce and Anders did not)
that they are promulgating "prophylactic rules."2 As Justice Scalia himself
196. Klein, supra note 38, at 7-16.
197. Strauss, supra note 68, at 13-15; David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules,
55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190 (1988).
198. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
199. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2344.
200. The difficulties involved in determining whether a ruling is "prophylactic" is illustrated
by the disagreement over the status of United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), holding that the
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noted, three years after Miranda, the Court announced it was throwing out a
confession because obtaining it "in the absence of the required warnings was
a flat violtion of the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment as
construed in Miranda."z"
I share David Strauss's view that Sullivan may plausibly be read as
adopting a prophylactic rule. I also agree that an analysis of Sullivan
suggests how rules that at first glance appear to be the product of ordinary
constitutional interpretation may turn out to be, like the Miranda rules,
"'prophylactic' rules that 'go beyond the Constitution itself' in the sense that
[they] reflect not just the values protected by [various clauses of the
Constitution] but institutional concerns about the most effective way to
secure those values. "2w
Professor Strauss asks:
Why are some false statements protected by the First Amendment,
even though they have "no constitutional value"? The Court gave
the common sense answer in New York Times v. Sullivan itself:
false speech must be protected to some degree in order to avoid
discouraging valuable speech .... [G]iven the inevitable
imprecision of judicial factfmding, a regime that protects only
speech that has "constitutional value" will end up deterring too
much valuable speech. Some speech that has (in the Court's own
words) "no constitutional value" must also be protected, because
the disadvantages of protecting it are outweighed by the gains.
... [Tihis justification parallels the justification for Miranda.
right to counsel applies to pretrial lineups. The Wade Court used language that sounded like it was
applying a prophylactic rule. For example, it told us that since "there is grave potential ... for
prejudice" in the pretrial lineup which, absent defense counsel's presence is essential to "avert
prejudice and assure a meaningful confrontation at trial." Id. at 236. Moreover, the Court pointed
out that legislation or regulations which eliminate "the risks of abuse and unintentional suggestion"
may also eliminate the need to regard the pretrial lineup "stage as 'critical.'" Id. at 239.
Nevertheless, Joseph Grano, a leading critic of Miranda, and prophylactic rules generally,
argues forcefully and persuasively that Wade's right to counsel requirement is not a prophylactic
rule after all. "The sixth amendment critical stage doctrine," maintains Professor Grano, "depends
upon fair trial considerations, and the fairness concern itself follows from the sixth amendment's
instrumental purpose of guaranteeing a fair trial.... The right to counsel requirement in Wade is
rooted squarely in the sixth amendment's right to counsel provision...." Grano, supra note 147,
at 120-21.
201. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2338-39 (quoting Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 326 (1969)).
202. Strauss, supra note 68, at 3. Perhaps one may resolve the dispute about the
"prophylactic" status of Sullivan peaceably by describing it, as three commentators have described
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (requiring an initial determination of the voluntariness of a
challenged confession to be determined by the trial judge in order to assure that involuntary
confessions will be excluded even if that issue goes to the jury), as a rule "not characterized [by the
court that decided it] as prophylactic, but nonetheless imposing a procedural prerequisite with a
prophylactic objective." LAFAVE, IsRAEL & KING, supra note 147, § 2.9(e), at 673.
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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The Supreme Court even characterized [the Sullivan] line of cases
as "extend[ing] a measure of strategic protection to defamatory
falsehood." . .. [l]f the notion of "go[ing] beyond what the First
Amendment demand[s] in order to provide some prophylaxis" has
any meaning, then New York Times v. Sullivan did it. The better
characterization is, to use the Dickerson dissent's terms, that
Sullivan held that what "the First Amendment demanded" is
precisely "some prophylaxis." Miranda held the same thing about
the Fifth Amendment.o
Another word about the Sullivan case. It is noteworthy that Justice Black,
who has sometimes accused his colleagues of engaging in judicial
lawmaking,' favored a more prophylactic "prophylactic rule" in Sullivan
than did the majority. For Justice Black did not believe the rule the majority
had adopted-a rule that "prohibits a public official from recovering damages
for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official misconduct unless he
proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'" 20'-furnished the
press adequate protection. Although he did not label it a "prophylactic
rule"-and he might have been shocked if someone had told him that was
what he was proposing-I think it fair to say that Justice Black advocated a
more drastic "prophylactic rule" than the one most of his colleagues found
sufficient:
203. Strauss, supra note 68, at 13-15; see also Huitema, supra note 160, at 272-74;
Landsberg, supra note 147, at 932, 934-35. The analogy to Sullivan also helps explain how the
Elstad exception (the refusal to apply the "fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to some Miranda
violation) can be reconciled with the view that Miranda is required by the Self-Incrimination
Clause. See Strauss, supra at 19-20:
To make the comparison to the First Amendment once again, the constitutional
rules governing defamation of public officials are different from the rules
governing defamation of private individuals, which are in turn different from
the rules governing defamation that addresses no subject of public interest.
These differences do not mean that the rule of New York unes v. Sullivan is
not a constitutional rule. They just mean that the constitutional rule that
applies in one set of circumstances might have to be altered when different
circumstances arise-a wholly unremarkable proposition. The Court in
Dickerson, in trying to explain why Elstad and similar cases did not impugn
the constitutional basis of Miranda, said that those cases only illustrate that "no
constitutional rule is immutable." Perhaps a better way to put it is that
constitutional rules are often not simple but require a degree of complexity and
refinement-a point that is obvious in many areas of constitutional law. It may
be that the Court struck the wrong balance in Elstad, or in one of the other
cases creating an exception to Miranda (or, for that matter, in Miranda itself).
But the fact that the Court refined the balance it struck in Miranda has no
bearing on the constitutional status or legitimacy of that decision.
204. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
205. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
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"Malice," even as defined by the Court, is an elusive, abstract
concept, hard to prove and hard to disprove. The requirement that
malice be proved provides at best an evanescent protection for the
right critically to discuss public affairs and certainly does not
measure up to the sturdy safeguard embodied in the First
Amendment. Unlike the Court, therefore, I vote to reverse
exclusively on the ground that the Times and the individual
defendants had an absolute, unconditional constitutional right to
publish in the Times advertisement their criticisms of the
Montgomery agencies and officials... . ' The half-million dollar
verdict [against the New York Times] give[s] dramatic proof...
that state libel laws threaten the very existence of an American
press virile enough to publish unpopular views on public affairs
and bold enough to criticize the conduct of public officials....
There is no reason to believe that there are not more such verdicts
lurking just around the corner for the Times or any other
newspaper or broadcaster which might dare to criticize public
officials. In fact, . . . there are now pending eleven libel suits by
local and state officials against the Times seeking $5,600,000, and
five such suits against the Columbia Broadcasting System seeking
$1,700,000....w
... Stopgap measures like those the Court adopts are in my
judgment not enough. This record certainly does not indicate that
any different verdict would have been rendered here whatever the
Court had charged the jury about "malice," "truth," "good
motives," "justifiable ends," or any other legal formulas which in
theory would protect the press. Nor does the record indicate that
any of these legalistic words would have caused the courts below to
set aside or to reduce the half-million-dollar verdict in any
amount.
2 W
Does anybody really believe that the standard Justice Black urged the
Court to adopt in Sullivan-a rule that would have given the press an
"absolute, unconditional" right to criticize public officials 2°9-stemmed from
the explicit language of the First Amendment or was directly sanctioned by
the First Amendment? If so, who needs prophylactic rules?
But we do need them. Recognizing the legitimacy and utility of
prophylactic rules and working out principles for establishing such rules
206. Id. at 293 (Black, J., joined by Douglas, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
207. Id. at 294-95.
208. Id. at 295.
209. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
[Ariz. St. L.J.424
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seem far preferable to engaging in the kind of strained "pure" constitutional
interpretation Justice Black did in his Sullivan concurring opinion.
2
'
0
IV. SOME FINAL REFLECTIONS
Miranda left the door open for Congress to replace the warnings with
other safeguards that perform the same function. Unfortunately, Congress
did not walk in the door. But the door remains open.
The alternative often mentioned is a system of audiotaping or videotaping
police questioning and a modified set of warnings.2  I think such a system
would and should pass constitutional muster. (It seems clear, however, that,
no matter how fool-proof, a tape recording system that dispensed with all
warnings would not be upheld.2 12)
If such a system replaced the four-fold Miranda warnings it would make
clear that "a decision may be both an interpretation of the Constitution and a
principle that Congress may modify." 213  However, I doubt that any
legislature will enact any audiotaping or videotaping system that contains
some warnings of rights or any other effective alternative to the Miranda
regime. For any alternative that is equally effective is likely to be
"politically unacceptable for precisely the reason that saves it from being
constitutionally unacceptable-it would be at least as protective of the suspect
(and therefore at least as burdensome to investigators) as Miranda itself."224
I believe Stephen Schulhofer is quite right-"politically attractive
alternatives to Miranda can't pass constitutional muster, and constitutional
alternatives can't attract political support. "215 That is why the Miranda
warnings will probably be with us for a long time.
210. See Landsberg, supra note 147, at 963.
211. Compare Cassell, supra note 6, at 486-97, with Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda's
Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishing Small Social Costs, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 556,
556-60 (1996).
212. As the Dickerson Court told us, referring to very similar language in the Miranda
opinion, "Miranda requires procedures that will warn a suspect in custody of his right to remain
silent and which will assure the suspect that the exercise of that right will be honored." Dickerson,
120 S. Ct. at 2335.
213. Strauss, supra note 68, at 4. As Professor Strauss observes many have recommended an
alternative to Sullivan-'a regime in which courts will determine, in any defamation action,
whether the statement was true or false, but rather than imposing damages liability will require the
speaker to publish a retraction (and perhaps pay the plaintiff s attorney's fees)." Id. at 22. Strauss
continues: "If such a scheme (or some other alternative) did indeed strike as good or better a
balance than Sullivan, there would be no good reason for the Court to reject a statute that adopted
it. But no one questions the constitutional status of Sullivan." Id.
214. Schulhofer, Puzzling Persistence, supra note 26, at 22.
215. Id.
425
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But there is nothing inappropriate or illegitimate about prophylactic rules
generally or the Miranda warnings in particular. I venture to say that the
rule that governed the admissibility of state confessions for thirty years prior
to Miranda-the "totality of circumstances"-"voluntariness" test-was no
more a rule of the pure Marbury variety, no more "directly compelled" by
the Constitution, and no more a product of the "explicit" text of the
Constitution than Miranda itself. Indeed, if anything, there is a stronger
relationship between the Miranda doctrine and the explicit text of the
Constitution than there is between the voluntariness rule and the
constitutional text. After all, the Miranda doctrine is based on the Self-
Incrimination Clause. The voluntariness is not; it simply grew out of general
due process.21 6
Prophylactic rules are simply a species of "bright-line" or per se rules.2t 7
Almost everything that can be said in favor of- per se rules applies to
216. Prophylactic rules are often contrasted with "core" or "true" or "explicit" constitutional
rules or rules that are "directly sanctioned or required" by the Constitution. See supra note 147.
But how can it be said that the confessions rule that preceded Miranda, the "totality of
circumstances"-"voluntariness" test, falls into the latter category? How can it be said that the
"voluntariness" test was explicitly or necessarily required by the Constitution?
The "voluntariness" rule cannot be called a requirement of the Self-Incrimination Clause,
because until the decision in Maloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), the privilege against self-
incrimination did not apply to the states and, in any event, until Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), it did not apply to the police station. So where did the confession rule the Court applied to
the states, starting with Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), come from? The Constitution
does not specifically mention "confessions" or "admissions." Nor do the terms "totality of
circumstances," "voluntary," "involuntary," "overbearing the will," "police questioning" or
"police interrogation" appear anywhere in the text. So why is the protection against the use of
"involuntary" confessions (as opposed to the protection afforded by Miranda) a "core constitutional
right"? Consider Anthony Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal
Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 785, 805-06 (1970):
In 1936 [when the Court decided Brown,] it was far from evident why the due
process clause required anything more of state criminal proceedings than a
regular and fair trial, giving the defendant a regular and fair opportunity to
contest his guilt under state evidentiary rules, including the rule which the
Supreme Court of Mississippi held allowed admission of the Brown confession.
217. Professors LaFave, Israel and King have made a valiant effort to distinguish 'per se"
rules from "prophylactic" ones, LAFAVE, ISRAEL & KING, supra note 147, at § 2.9(d)-(e), but I do
not believe that many Justices have received the word. Over the years they have frequently used
the terms "bright-line" rules, "per se" rules and "prophylactic" rules interchangeably. The opinion
of the Court in Miranda never called the new doctrine prophylactic, but dissenting Justice White
twice called it a per se rule. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 536, 544; see also Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S.
638 (1984); supra note 173. In declining to give Edwards retroactive effect, the Court, per Justice
White (author of the Edwards opinion), called it a "prophylactic rule" at one point, but referred to
"its per se approach at another point, id. at 647, and also described the case as having "established
a bright-line rule," id. at 646. Concurring in Solem v. Stumes, Justice Powell called Edwards a
"prophylactic rule" at one point, but a "per se rule" at two other places. Id. at 652, 654. In
Arizona v. Roberson, which reaffirmed Edwards, the Court, per Stevens, J., referred to "the bright-
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prophylactic rules as well. 8 So far as I know, no one has even questioned
the constitutional legitimacy of "per se" or "bright-line" rules, certainly not
the ones that work in favor of law-enforcement.1 9 It is hard to avoid the
conclusion that "[t ]he charge that prophylactic rules . . are constitutionally
illegitimate seems ... merely a policy preference in favor of under-
enforcement rather than over-enforcement of individual liberties. "'
"The characterization of Miranda as a prophylactic rule that 'goes
beyond' the Constitution seems to be a way of saying that Miranda
represents [a] kind of deliberate choice to exclude some voluntary
confessions, in exchange for the benefits of identifying or deterring some
line, prophylactic Edwards rule," 486 U.S. 675, 682 (1988), and reminded us that "[wle have
repeatedly emphasized the virtues of a bright-line rule in cases following Edwards as well as
Miranda." Id. at 681.
In Dickerson the Court, per Rehnquist, C.J., looked back on Miranda as a case that "concluded
that the coercion inherent in custodial interrogation blurs the line between voluntary and involuntary
statements and thus heightens the risk that an individual will not be 'accorded his privilege under
the Fifth Amendment... not to be compelled to incriminate himself.'" 120 S. Ct. at 2331. The
Dickerson Court also observed that the Miranda Court had "noted that reliance on the traditional
totality-of-the-circumstances test raised a risk of overlooking an involuntary custodial confession."
Id. at 2335. Under the LaFave-Israel-King analysis, therefore, the Dickerson Court seemed to view
the Miranda warnings as per se rules rather than prophylactic ones. See also Archibald Cox, The
Role of Congress in Constitutional Determination, 40 U. CIN. L. REV. 199, 250-52 (1971).
It is noteworthy that Francis Allen, whose pioneering articles in the early 1950s paved the way
for much of the constitutional-criminal procedure scholarship that followed, did not call the
Miranda doctrine "prophylactic." He cited Miranda rather as an example of the Warren Court's
"tendency . .. to turn to broad legislative-like directives, sometimes called 'flat' or 'per se' rules."
Allen, supra note 3, at 532 & n.66. What Professor Allen said of "per se" rules applies to
"prophylactic" ones as well: "They give relatively certain guidance to the lower courts" and are
"applicable to a great mass of cases at the trial court level without direct involvement of the
Supreme Court." Id.
218. Almost everything Professors LaFave, Israel and King say about "per se" (or "bright-
line") rules strikes me as applicable to "prophylactic" rules as well: They utilize "a standard that
looks to a single characteristic or event and does not adjust to the uniqueness of each case,"
LAFAVE, ISRAEL & KING, supra note 147, § 2.9(d), at 659; have "produced high visibility
benchmarks that captured the attention of both administrators and the public," id. § 2.9(d), at 669;
provide guidance to police officers "'who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and
balance the social and individual interests in the specific circumstances they confront,'" id. §
2.9(d), at 666; have "provided less room for manipulation by judges disposed to evasion, in part
because they often become applicable without extensive factflnding," id. § 2.9(d), at 670; they are
"either overinclusive or underinclusive as compared to the application of that function to all relevant
circumstances on a case-by-case basis," id. § 2.9(d), at 660; are based on the notion that "the
applicable constitutional guarantee should be interpreted in light of administrative realities, as well
as the logic of its function," id. § 2.9(d), at 660 n.155; and are "imposed in the exercise of the
Court's inherent authority to determine the appropriate scope of an interpretive rule," id.
219. See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S.
454 (1981); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
220. Klein, supra note 38, at 20-21; see also Landsberg, supra note 147, at 951.
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compelled confessions that would otherwise escape detection.""' The
Miranda rules do "go beyond" the Constitution "in the sense that [they]
reflect not just the values protected by the Fifth Amendment but institutional
concerns about the most effective way to secure those values. ,M However,
"[v]irtually all of constitutional law" does. 2M
At times prophylactic rules are "necessary to combat a substantial
potential for constitutional violations."224 Such rules "are based on the
Constitution because they are predicated on a judicial judgment that the risk
of a constitutional violation is sufficiently great that simple case-by-case
enforcement of the core right is insufficient to secure that right."2
At times, as demonstrated by cases like Miranda and Pearce, the two
rulings that have "come to be viewed as paradigmatic of prophylactic
decisionmaking," 2  the power to fashion prophylactic rules is the power to
make constitutional guarantees more meaningful and more effective. This
power is inherent in the art of constitutional interpretation-indeed, in the art
of judging.
221. Strauss, supra note 68, at 8.
222. Id. at 3.
223. Id. However, in different circumstances, institutional concerns may lead to different
results:
Miranda excludes some statements that are not "compelled" within meaning of
the Fifth Amendment ... because, on balance, the benefits of the Miranda
rules, when compared with a case-by-case inquiry into compulsion, outweigh
that undesirable side-effect. In certain circumstances, though, the comparison
between Miranda and the case-by-case approach might come out differently;
the balance of costs and benefits might tip in favor of proceeding case by case.
The Court reasoned, rightly or wrongly, that cases like Tucker, Quarles, and
Elstad presented such circumstances. This called for refinements of the
Miranda rule, but it did not change the basic character of the Miranda rules
(with or without refinements)-that they are both prophylactic and "found in
the Constitution" in the same way as other principles of constitutional law.
See id. at 16-17.
224. LAFAvE, ISRAEL & KING, supra note 147, § 2.9(e), at 676.
225. Landsberg, supra note 147, at 950.
226. LAFAVE, ISRAEL & KING, supra note 147, § 2.9(e), at 676.
HeinOnline  -- 33 Ariz. St. L.J. 428 2001
